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In the empirical R&D literature, several studies found that the substantial increase of the 
R&D agreements in many industrial sectors had a role in maintaining firms in the mar-
ketplace (e.g., Hagedoorn et al. 2000; Hagedoorn and van Ekert 2002; Belderbos et al. 
2004). Other studies discussed the cooperation of firms in R&D under a network con-
cept (e.g., Fritsch and Lukas 2001; Okamuro 2007; Miotti and Sachwald 2003; Tomasello 
et al. 2013). The focus of those papers was on determining the structural changes of the 
network over time. The main conclusion for different samples of data reported in those 
papers demonstrates the intensity of R&D agreements. This interesting observation 
means that the cooperation exhibit characteristic features of complex networks (Ahuja 
2000; Stuart 2000; Verspagen and Duysters 2004; Tomasello et  al. 2013). The authors 
found that highly connected firms (firms with many links) have a role in constructing 
such complexity.
For the purpose of the current study, the most important conclusion of those empiri-
cal works lies in continuing the overall structure of the cooperation network over time. 
In a sense that the complex R&D network almost becomes a stable network. This leads 
us to investigate theoretically the stability of the R&D network. In the theoretical R&D 
literature, the most common stable R&D structure is a complete network (Goyal and 
Moraga-Gonzalez 2001; Goyal and Joshi 2003; Song and Vannetelbosch 2007; Deroian 
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2008; Westbrock 2010; Zu et al. 2011; Konig et al. 2012; Zirulia 2012). This means that 
the current paper mainly focuses on the complete networks.
We consider a network game for firms conduct R&D to reduce the cost of the produc-
tion. The model structure is based on Goyal and Moraga-Gonzalez (2001), and it can 
be briefly described as follows. The structure that displays firms cooperate in R&D can 
be described as an R&D network where the players (firms) are represented by nodes 
and the R&D partnerships (cooperation) are represented by links. The model consists 
of three stages: network formation, R&D investment (effort) and market competition. 
The marginal cost of the production decreases with increasing the individual effort and 
effort of other firms in the network. Specifically, if any two firms are linked, the spillover 
is set one; otherwise there is a free spillover less than one (the ability to take advantage of 
partners’ R&D investment).
Specifically, Goyal and Moraga-Gonzalez readdressed the R&D model as R&D net-
work where R&D effort (investment) is endogenous. They ignored the cost of the coop-
eration and considered Cournot competition for symmetric and asymmetric networks 
with independent and homogeneous goods. They found that for independent goods, the 
complete network (each two nodes in the network are linked) is uniquely stable network. 
Also, they stated that the complete network is stable if goods are homogeneous whatever 
the value of the R&D spillover.
There are many papers based on Goyal and Moraga-Gonzalez model (e.g., Song and 
Vannetelbosch 2007; Zirulia 2012; Zu et al. 2011). Song and Vannetelbosch (2007) stud-
ied the case when there are three firms belonging to different countries and producing 
homogeneous goods. For asymmetric R&D networks with and without government sub-
sidies, they found that the complete network is stable. Zu et al. (2011) focused on the 
stability and efficiency of R&D networks for three international firms. They also found 
that the complete network is stable. Moreover, Zirulia (2012) extended Goyal and Mor-
aga-Gonzalez model by linking the R&D spillover to technological heterogeneity. They 
assumed that there are two technological groups where firms in the same group have the 
same technology; whereas firms from different groups have different technologies. They 
stated that the complete network is stable. In addition, Goyal and Joshi (2003) studied 
cooperation of firms under different network model. In their model, the effects of link 
formation are exogenous, in particular the marginal cost decreases with the number 
of the R&D partners. They considered this set for Cournot and Bertrand competition 
where the cost of the cooperation is considered. They found that in the case of Cournot 
competition that the complete network is uniquely stable network.
The current paper contributes to the theoretical R&D literature through studying 
the interests of constructing the stable architecture of R&D cooperation. In particular, 
this paper carries two aims. The first aim is to investigate theoretically the relationship 
between the economic returns on the outcomes and the expansion of the stable network. 
The second aim is to study the stability of the components of R&D networks and com-
pare the outcomes with those resulting from small stable networks. According to Goyal 
and Moraga-Gonzalez, if goods are independent, the outcomes are positively affected 
by the number of cooperative links. This indicates that the expansion of the R&D net-
work always improves the equilibrium outcomes. Because of that, we do our study in 
this paper for homogeneous goods.
Page 3 of 17Alghamdi  SpringerPlus  (2016) 5:1570 
For the first aim, we assume that the network size increases and with each newcomer, 
firms form a complete network (a stable network).1 We investigate how the number of 
firms affects the private incentives to form intense collaboration. The results suggest that 
the relationship between the equilibrium outcomes of the complete network and the 
number of firms is monotonic. For the individuals, the higher size of a stable network 
produces smaller outcomes. This means the R&D effort and the quantity of the produc-
tion decrease with growing the size of the stable network. For the profits of firms, while 
Goyal and Moraga-Gonzalez stressed the value of the R&D agreements, increase size of 
the complete network reduces the firms’ incentives to form the cooperation. That is, if 
the existing and newcomer firms work to build a complete network, their profits will 
decrease. This result may reflect the reality of the real-world cooperation between firms 
where it is impossible to be described the real network as a complete network.
Moreover, there are two other observations on the profit of firms in a growing com-
plete network. The first observation suggests that the reduction in the profit is not fixed 
despite of the regular growth in the network. The second observation concerns the out-
comes in a large complete network. As the number of firms increases, it is expected that 
the profits reach the lower level. Also, the growth of the complete network has a negative 
impact on the industry profit and overall welfare. However, for the consumer surplus, 
the expansion the complete network generates high outcomes.
For the second aim of this paper, we assume a network consists of several complete 
components and a complete network. Firstly, the stability of components does not gen-
erate a stable overall network. When comparing the outcomes of the stable components 
of a network with the outcomes of the complete network consisted of the same size of 
each component, we find that the individual outcomes of the complete components are 
smaller than the outcomes of the complete network. Secondly, comparing the outcomes 
of the complete giant component with the outcomes of other components of a network 
shows that the individual outcomes are higher in the giant component.
The paper is structured as follows. In the second section, we provide foundations in 
the social network and microeconomics and we introduce the Goyal and Moraga-Gon-




A network is formed by a set of vertices (nodes) and a set of edges (links) connecting 
these vertices (Newman 2003; Jackson 2008). We define N as a set of all vertices labeled 
by letters i, j, k , . . . where |N | = n and E =
{
ij, jk , . . .
}
 is a set of all edges in the network 
where |E| = m is the number of links. Then G(N, E) denotes a network with nodes N and 
links E, and for simplicity the network is denoted by G. For the purpose of this article, we 
focus on undirected networks; meaning that each link between any two vertices runs in 
both directions (i.e., each two links ij and ji in G are the same). We also focus on simple 
networks that have neither parallel edges (edges that have the same end vertices) nor 
loops (edges where their start and end vertices are the same).
1 When we say size of the network, we mean the number of firms in the network.
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Nodes linked to node i ∈ N  is defined as a set of neighbors of that node: 
Ni =
{
j ∈ N : ij ∈ E
}
. The length of the neighbors’ set of node i is a degree of 
that node. Thus, the degree of each node i ∈ N  is denoted by deg(i) = |Ni| where 
0 ≤ deg(i) ≤ n− 1 . If G is a complete network (each two nodes in G are linked), 
then for any i ∈ G, deg(i) = n− 1. Usually, the complete network consists of n nodes 
is denoted by Kn. An empty network En is a graph consists of n nodes without links 
between them.
A subgraph G′(N ′ ,E ′) of the network G(N, E) is a graph such that N ′ ⊆ N  and E ′ ⊆ E. 
A component of the graph G is defined as a connected subgraphs where the largest con-
nected component is called the giant component.
The model
The emphasis in this paper is on the linear-quadratic function of consumers given by 
Hackner (2000):
Here the demand parameters a > 0 denotes the willingness of consumers to pay and 
α > 0 is the diminishing marginal rate of consumption, while qi is the quantity con-
sumed of good i and I measures the consumer’s consumption of all other products. The 
parameter  such that −1 ≤  ≤ 1 captures the marginal rate of substitution between 
different products. In this paper, we consider homogeneous goods ( = 1) and to sim-
plify the analysis, we assumed that α = 1.
If the consumer buys qi of good i where m is a consumer’s income and pi is the 
price of good i, the money spent is piqi and the balance is I = m− piqi. By sub-
stituting into (1), we determine the optimal consumption of good i by calculating 
∂U
∂qi
= a− qi − 
∑
j �=i qj − pi = 0. This implies the inverse demand function for each 
good i
The profit πi for firm i is
where pi is the price of good i produced by firm i and ci is the production cost.

















D−1i = pi = a− qi − 
∑
j �=i
qj , i = 1, . . . , n.
(3)πi = (pi − ci)qi =















(5)TW = CS +,
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where � =
∑n
i=1 πi is the industry surplus.
R&D network model
The focus of this paper is on Goyal and Moraga-Gonzalez model. In their model, if firms 
cooperate in R&D, they are linked in an undirected network and spillover is set at one 
where the cost of link formation is assumed to be negligible. If firms do not cooperate, 
they are not linked and there is a spillover (β ∈ [0, 1)) between non-linked firms.
Goyal and Moraga-Gonzalez (2001) examined an oligopolistic market under Cournot 
competition with linear demand for symmetric and asymmetric networks. They focused 
on the impact of the cooperative links on R&D investment and on the incentives of firms 
to cooperate. Moreover, their study investigated the situations in which the conflict 
between the stability and efficiency of R&D networks occurs. For stability of the R&D 
network with homogeneous goods, they found that the complete network is a stable 
network.
1. Complete R&D network
In a complete network, each two firms are linked. We denote Kn to the complete net-
work consists of n firms. When we say the size of the complete network increases, we 
mean that the existing and new entering firms cooperate together to form a new com-
plete network.
2. Stages of the model
In Goyal and Moraga-Gonzalez, firms strategically form bilateral collaborative links with 
other firms where the collaboration of firms is modeled as a three-stage game.
The first stage: Each firm chooses its research partners. Firms and the cooperative 
links together constitute a network of cooperation in R&D.
The second stage: Given the R&D network, each firm chooses the amounts of invest-
ment (effort) in R&D simultaneously and independently in order to reduce the cost of 
production.
The third stage: Given the R&D investments of each firm and the effective R&D effort 
(as determined by the R&D network), firms compete in the product market by setting 
quantities (Cournot competition) in order to maximize their profits.
3. Cost reduction
In Goyal and Moraga-Gonzalez, the effective R&D effort for each firm is defined by the 
following equation:
where xi denotes R&D effort of firm i, Ni is the set of firms participating in a joint ven-
ture with firm i and β ∈ [0, 1) is an exogenous parameter that captures knowledge spillo-
vers acquired from firms not engaged in a joint venture with firm i. The effective R&D 
effort reduces firm i’s marginal cost (c) of production
(6)






xk , i = 1, . . . , n,
Page 6 of 17Alghamdi  SpringerPlus  (2016) 5:1570 
The effort is assumed to be costly and the function of the cost is quadratic, so that 
the cost of R&D is γ x2i , where γ > 0 indicates the effectiveness of R&D expenditure 
(D’Aspremont and Jacquemin 1988). The profit πi for firm i is the difference between 
revenue and production cost minus the cost of R&D
where the marginal cost satisfy a > c.
4. Equilibria for complete networks
In a complete network, each two firms are linked, thus the effective effort function for 
each firm i becomes
From the Eq.  (8), we can find the best response function of R&D effort for each firm 
i by calculating the first order condition (∂πi
∂xi
= 0). By substituting them to each other, 
we find the equilibrium effort. Then, we go backward to find the other equilibria. In the 
“Appendix”, we list the equilibria under homogeneous Cournot competition [cited from 
Goyal and Moraga-Gonzalez (2001)].
5. Effectiveness γ
According to Goyal and Moraga-Gonzalez, if goods are homogeneous ( = 1), then the 
effectiveness should satisfy
The condition shows that γ = 1 is sufficient for any network size n.2
6. Pairwise stability and efficiency
The study of R&D cooperation under the network game involves the concepts of pair-
wise stability and efficiency. The pairwise stability depends on firms’ profit functions 
and it is a necessary condition for strategic stability as shown in Jackson and Wolinsky 
(1996).
Definition 1 (Pairwise stability) For any network G to be stable, the following two 
conditions need to be satisfied for any two firms i, j ∈ G:
(7)



















qi − γ x2i i = 1, . . . , n,
(9)
Xi = xi +
∑
j∈Ni
xj , i = 1, . . . , n.
(10)γ > max{n2/(n+ 1)2, a/4c}.
2 To have suitable values of the effectiveness, the effort and cost functions should be non-negative and the second order 
condition for maximizing profit function (∂2pi
∂x2
< 0) should be satisfied (Goyal and Moraga-Gonzalez 2001).
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1. If ij ∈ G, πi(G) ≥ πi(G − ij) and πj(G) ≥ πj(G − ij),
2. If ij /∈ G and if πi(G) < πi(G + ij), then πj(G) > πj(G + ij),
G − ij is the network resulting from deleting a link ij from the network G and G + ij is 
the network resulting from adding a link ij to the network G. From this definition, net-
work G is stable if no firm can obtain higher profit from deleting one of its links; and any 
other link between two firms would benefit only one of them.
The definition of the efficiency of a network that is given as follows and is determined 
by the total welfare generated from that network.
Definition 2 (Network efficiency) Network G is said to be efficient if no other network 
G´ can be generated by adding or deleting links, such that TW (G´) > TW (G).
The stability of R&D networks
In this section, we discuss two issues. The first issue concerns the impact of the expansion 
of the stable network on the economic outcomes. The second issue concerns the stability 
of the components of a network. For the stability, we focus on the complete networks for 
two reasons. The first reason, this type of networks is stable, according to many studies 
(e.g., Song and Vannetelbosch 2007; Zirulia 2012; Zu et al. 2011; Goyal and Joshi 2003). 
The second reason, for the complete networks, we can derive general equations describe 
the economic variables from which we can conduct studies on their behavior.
The impact of the growing size on the stability of the network
Generally, the growth of the stable network (i.e., the complete network) yields reduction in 
the equilibrium outcomes. For the individuals, the R&D effort, the production and the profit 
decrease with each newcomer firm into the network cooperating with all existing firms.
Proposition 1 Given a complete network Kn, assume that the effectiveness γ satisfies 
(10). The R&D effort, quantity and profit of firms are monotonically decreasing functions 
with respect to the network size n.
The proof is given in the “Appendix”.
Concerning the profit of firms in the stable network Kn (Proposition 1), we have two 
other results. The first result shows that the reduction in the profit by increasing the 
size of the stable network is not a constant amount (see Fig. 1). Meaning that for any n, 
πi(Kn)− πi(Kn+1) �= πi(Kn+1)− πi(Kn+2).
Corollary 1 Given complete networks Kn and Kn+1, assume that kn and kn+1 are the 
number of links in that two networks, respectively. The profit in Kn and Kn+1 can be writ-
ten as πi(Kn+1) = πi(Kn)− ǫkn+1,kn such that ǫkn+1,kn is not a fixed amount among differ-
ent stable networks.
The second result relates to a large R&D network. The decrease in the individual profit 
in the stable network Kn with increasing the firms indicates that in the large network, the 
profit is expected to be very small.
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Corollary 2 Given a large complete R&D network Kn (n→∞), then limn→∞ πi(Kn) = δ 
where δ > 0 is very small.
Previous results inferred directly from the Proposition 1 for this they do not need to 
prove. The following example shows these results with growing the size of the complete 
network.
Example 1 Let Kn be a complete network with n firms. Assume that the size of Kn 
increases from n =  3 to n =  30 where the resulting network with each new firm is a 
complete network. Figure 1 demonstrates the reduction of the R&D effort, quantity and 
profit with increasing the network size n.
The question that can be raised here is, with growing the size of a network, how fast 
profits vanish in an empty and a complete network? In other words, how the number 
of firms impact the profits when all firms share their knowledge compared to the case 
when each of them participate in R&D alone? Firstly, since the profit increases with 
cooperation, then the profit under the complete network is always more than under the 
empty network. Secondly, from Corollary 1, the gap between the profits under the two 
networks with increasing firms is not fixed.
Fig. 1 The R&D effort, quantity and profit of firms with increasing the complete network size. The parameters 
used to plot the figures are a = 2, c = 1 and γ = 1 for 3 ≤ n ≤ 30
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Finally, when comparing the profits of firms under the complete and empty networks, 
the result shows that the gap decreases with a growing number of firms. The following 
proposition state this result and Example 2 provides more explanations.
Proposition 2 Given networks Kn and En, assume that the effectiveness γ satisfies (10). 
The gap between profits of firms under two networks decreases with respect to the number 
of firms n.
The proof is given in the “Appendix”.
Example 2 For n firms, assume there are two different networks the complete and 
empty networks. Assume that the number of firms increases from n = 3 to n = 30 in 
both networks. Figure 2 shows the profits under the two networks with increasing n.
In the overall economic view, the growth of the population of the complete network 
has negative and positive impacts. The industry profit and overall welfare decrease in 
the number of firms in the complete network. However, the consumer surplus increases 
with growing the size of the complete network.
Proposition 3 Given a complete network Kn, assume that the effectiveness γ satisfies the 
condition (10). With respect to the network size n,
1. The industry profit and the total welfare are monotonically decreasing functions,
2. The consumer surplus is a monotonically increasing function.
The proof is given in the “Appendix”.
The following example demonstrates the previous proposition.
Example 3 Let Kn be a complete network with n firms. If the complete network size n 
increases, Fig. 3 shows a reduction in the outcomes of the industry profit and the total 
welfare and an increase in the consumer surplus outcome.
Fig. 2 The profits of firms under the complete Kn and the empty network En. The parameters used to plot the 
figures are a = 2, c = 1 and γ = 1 for 3 ≤ n ≤ 30
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Stability of components of networks
The stability of components of any network does not guarantee the stability of the overall 
network. For example, a network contains two complete components where each com-
ponent contains three firms. Each component forms a stable network, but the resulting 
network of those components (a symmetric network with six firms) is not stable. This 
also occurs if the overall network consists of a giant component where the stability of 
that giant component does not mean that the overall network is stable.
Proposition 4 Given a network G consists of n firms. If C1,C2,C3, . . . are stable compo-
nents of G, the overall network G is not necessarily stable.
Corollary 3 Given a network G consists of n firms where GC is the giant component of 
G. If GC is stable, the overall network G is not necessarily stable.
The first two networks in Fig. 4 consist of two complete components before and after 
connecting them i. e., G1 and G2 respectively. Figure 5 (left) compares the profit of firm i 
in those networks. Figure 5 (right) compares the profit of firms in the complete network 
Fig. 3 The R&D effort, quantity and profit of firms with increasing the complete network size. The parameters 















Fig. 4 The figure shows four different networks G1, G2, G3 and K6
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K6 with their profits in a network G3 that consists of a giant component GC and another 
component C2.
Example 4 Figure 4 shows a network G1 has two complete components, each of size 3 
firms and a network G2 consisted of two linked complete components. Also, the figure 
shows a network G3 contains on a giant component and a complete network K6.
1. The network G1 has two components where each one forms a complete network. 
Consider one component of them, for example C1. This component is stable since 
it forms a stable network, similarly for the component C2. Thus, the network G1 
consists of two stable components. However, if we consider the two components 
together (C1 and C2 in the network G1), the overall network is not stable because each 
firm seeks to have a higher profit which is acquired by forming new links. This result 
can be verified by comparing the profit of firm i in C1 in the network G1 (before cre-
ating a link with any firm in C2) with its profit in the network G2 (after creating a link 
with one firm in C2). Figure 5 (left) shows that the profit of firm i in G1 is smaller than 
in the network G2. This suggests that the network that consists of several stable com-
ponents is not stable.
2. The network G3 has a giant component GC and another component C2. The giant 
component is a stable network since it forms a complete network with four firms. 
However, the overall network G3 is not stable. This can be shown by comparing the 
profit of firms in the components GC and C2 and in the network K6. From Fig.  5 
(right), Firms in C2 have the lowest profits. These profits increase when firms in that 
component cooperate with firms in the giant component.
According to Goyal and Moraga-Gonzalez (2001), the individual outcomes (the pro-
duction quantity and the profit) increase with increasing the own cooperative links. This 
implies that the individual outcomes of the complete giant component of the network G 
are higher than the outcomes of any component contained in G.
Fig. 5 The individual outcomes in the networks given in Fig. 4. The figure on the left compares the profit of 
firm i in two different networks G1 and G2. The figure on the right compares the profit in the components GC 
and C2 and in the complete network K6. The parameters used to plot the figures are a = 2, c = 1 and γ = 2
Page 12 of 17Alghamdi  SpringerPlus  (2016) 5:1570 
Proposition 5 Given a network G consists of n firms where GC is the giant component. 
If GC forms a complete structure, then for any component C of G, we find q∗(GC) > q∗(C) 
and π∗(GC) > π∗(C).
Example 5 (Item 2) shows the previous result. Figure 7 compares the quantity and the 
profit in those two components. The result indicates that the outcomes in the giant com-
ponent are higher than in the component C2.
Now, assume a network consisted of complete components (stable components) like 
network G1 in Fig. 7. Assume each complete component has n firms and let Kn be a com-
plete network has n firms. Proposition 6 compares the outcomes of the stable compo-
nents with the outcomes of the complete network contained an exact number of firms in 
each component.
Proposition 6 Given a network G consists of a set of complete components C1,C2,C3, . . . 
where each component is of size n. Let Kn be a complete network has n firms. With respect 
to the condition (10), the individual outcomes (quantity and profit) of each Ci are smaller 










Fig. 6 The figure shows three different networks: the network G1 has two disconnected components, the 
network G2 has giant component, and the complete network K3
Fig. 7 The individual outcomes in the network G1 consisted of a complete giant component GC. The figure 
compares the quantity and the profit in the components GC and C2. The parameters used to plot the figures 
are a = 2, c = 1 and γ = 2
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The previous results (from Proposition 4 to Proposition 6) do not need to prove 
because they naturally resulting from the link of the gain to the number collaborations 
(Goyal and Moraga-Gonzalez 2001).
Example 5 Figure 6 shows three different networks: the networks G1 and G2 given in 
Example 4 and the complete network K3.
1. As shown in Fig. 7, the individual outcomes of the giant complete component GC is 
higher than the outcomes of the anther component C2.
2. The individual outcomes (the quantity and the profit) of each complete component is 
lower than the outcomes in the complete network K3 (see Fig. 8).
 Conclusion
The aim of this paper was to extend the analysis of the stability of R&D network forma-
tion with the intensity of competition. Under Cournot model with homogeneous prod-
ucts, the main results are summarized as follows.
Firstly, firms’ outcomes and the social welfare in stable networks are negatively related 
to the size of that network. This indicates that the improvement of the outcomes in the 
stable networks is acquired when firms belong to small networks. Secondly, examining 
the stability of the components and comparing the outcomes with those generating from 
stable networks showed that there is no relationship between the stability of a network 
and the stability of its components. Finally, the individual profits in a complete network 
are higher than their profits in small stable components.
Fig. 8 The individual outcomes in the complete network K3 and in the complete components C1 and C2. 
The size of each component is three firms as the size of K3. The parameters used to plot the figures are a = 2, 
c = 1 and γ = 1
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Appendix
The equilibria for the complete network Kn:
Effort: x∗ = a−c
γ (n+1)2−n
 .
Quantity: q∗ = γ (n+1)(a−c)
γ (n+1)2−n
 .












Proof of Proposition 1 For simplicity, we prove the proposition for (a− c) = 1.
1. The R&D effort
The equilibrium effort for the complete network consists of n firms is
We want to show that as n increases, the effort x∗ decreases. Calculate dx / dn, we have
From the condition 10, we have dxdn < 0. This indicates that the R&D effort of firms in the 
network Kn decreases as the size n increases.
2. The quantity
The equilibrium quantity of the complete network with n firms is
Calculate dq/dn, we have
The terms γ (n+ 1)2 − n and 2γ (n+ 1)− 1 are positive (from the condition 10) and this 
yields dq/dn < 0. This implies that the production quantity in Kn decreases with grow-
ing n.
3. The profit: The equilibrium profit for the complete network consists of n firms is
x∗ =
a− c





−2γ (n+ 1)− 1
(γ (n+ 1)2 − n)2
.
q∗ =
γ (n+ 1)(a− c)





γ (γ (n+ 1)2 − n)− γ (n+ 1)(2γ (n+ 1)− 1)
(γ (n+ 1)2 − n)2
.
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By calculating dπ/dn, we have
Since (n+ 1)2γ 2 − (γ + 2) > 0, then dπ/dn < 0 which implies that the equilibrium 
profit decreases as the number of firms in Kn increases. 
Proof of Proposition 2 The equilibrium profit for the complete and empty networks 
consists of n firms are
The difference between the two profits is
Let (a− c) = 1. By calculating dπ∗d/dn, we have
Since γ (n+ 1)2(2− n)− 1 < 0, then dπ∗d/dn < 0. This implies that the difference 
between equilibrium profits under complete and empty networks decreases as the num-
ber of firms increases.  
Proof of Proposition 3 For simplicity, we prove the results by assuming (a− c) = 1.
1. The consumer surplus
The consumer surplus for the complete network consists of n firms is
We want to show that CS∗ is an increasing function with n. From dCS/dn, we have
π∗ =
(γ 2(n+ 1)2 − 1)(a− c)2
















γ 2(n+ 1)2 − 1
)
(a− c)2(




γ 2(n+ 1)2 − n2
)
(a− c)2(
γ (n+ 1)2 − n
)2 .
π∗d =
(n2 − 1)(a− c)2




γ (n+ 1)2(2− n)− 1
)
[
γ (n+ 1)2 − n
]3 .
CS∗ =
n2γ 2(n+ 1)2(a− c)2
2
(







γ (n+ 1)2 − n2
)
(
γ (n+ 1)2 − n
)3 > 0.
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This indicates that the consumer surplus increases as the complete network size n 
increases.
2. The industry profit
The proof of this item is straightforward from the equilibrium profit in Proposition 1.
3. The total welfare
The total welfare for Kn is
From dTW/dn, we have
For each network size n where the effectiveness γ satisfies the condition (10), the 
expression inside the square bracket in the numerator is positive. This implies that 
dTW /dn < 0 which means the total welfare decreases with growing the complete net-
work size.  
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